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Introduction  
Recent published studies suggest that the use of what-if analysis often leads decision makers to become 
overly confident in their resulting decisions. The purpose of the present research is to investigate the 
theoretical mechanisms underlying this inflated sense of confidence. The two candidate mechanisms 
examined relate to two prominent features of what-if analysis. First, the additional effort put forth 
physically entering decision scenarios into a what-if model compared to unaided decision making may be a 
form of "active involvement" which could lead to inflated expectations of success according to the illusion 
of control principle. Second, witnessing a broader range of simulated future outcomes via the what-if model 
might inflate the "imaginability" of successful outcomes, which theoretically could exaggerate decision 
makers' perceptions of the likelihood of those outcomes. The present research proposes an experiment to 
assess the relative roles of "active involvement" and "imaginability of outcomes" as underlying 
determinants of overconfidence during what-if analysis. The experimental design involves independently 
manipulating entry of model input and receipt of model results, and assessing their relative impact on 
decision confidence. Such research would have important implications for designing interventions aimed at 
reducing overconfidence using what-if analysis as well as for identifying possible sources of biased 
confidence in other types of decision support tools. 
What-if analysis has long been among the most widely used capabilities of computer-based decision 
support systems. What-if analysis is a method for manipulating a quantitative model of a business situation 
in which decision makers specify alternative values of decision variables and environmental assumptions, 
and the computer solves the model and displays predicted results. Numerous computer programs, including 
IFPS and Excel, are available for creating business models and interrogating them via what-if analysis. 
Despite this popularity, research to date on the effectiveness of what-if analysis, and decision support 
systems in general, has produced mixed results (for reviews, see Benbasat & Nault, 1990; and Sharda, Barr, 
& McDonnell, 1988). Researchers have often been unable to find any performance differences between 
assisted and unassisted decision making (e.g., Aldag & Power, 1986; Goslar, Green, & Hughes, 1986). 
Significant effects, when found, have sometimes been positive (e.g., Benbasat & Dexter, 1982; Benbasat & 
Schroeder, 1977; Sharda, et al., 1988), and sometimes negative (e.g., Chakravarti, Mitchell, & Staelin, 
1979; Kottemann & Remus, 1987).  
Why is what-if analysis so popular when research has been unable to demonstrate consistent advantages? 
Do decision makers overestimate the effectiveness of what-if analysis? Several research studies have 
documented that people do often overestimate the effectiveness of what-if analysis. In a simulated 
production scheduling task, the use of what-if analysis had no significant effect on decision quality 
compared to unaided decision making, and yet subjects perceived what-if to be significantly more effective 
(Davis & Kottemann, 1994; Kottemann, et al., 1994). When offered the advice of a simple but powerful 
decision rule, subjects perceived no significant difference in effectiveness between using the rule versus 
what-if analysis (Davis & Kottemann, 1994; 1995). When users overestimate their decision performance 
using what-if analysis, they are apt to unintentionally degrade their own performance by using it to the 
exclusion of alternative tools that may well be more effective than what-if analysis (such as quantitative 
decision rules). 
Hypotheses  
As evidence begins to accumulate that decision makers at least sometimes overestimate the effectiveness of 
what-if analysis relative to alternatives such as unaided decision making and decision rules, more research 
is needed on the issue of why these misperceptions occur and, therefore, what can be done to correct them. 
The present research investigates two theoretical mechanisms underlying the formation of inflated 
performance beliefs using what-if analysis. First, the additional effort put forth physically typing decision 
scenarios into a what-if model compared to unaided decision making may be a form of "active 
involvement" which could lead to inflated expectations of success according to the illusion of control 
principle. Second, witnessing a broader range of simulated future outcomes via the what-if model might 
inflate the "imaginability" of successful outcomes, which theoretically could exaggerate their perceived 
likelihood of occurring. 
Theory  
Langer (1975) theorized and provided evidence that when factors ordinarily associated with increased 
performance in skill situations are introduced into situations at least partially determined by chance, a 
person's expectation of success on the task is inflated to levels that are inappropriately higher than objective 
circumstances warrant. As Langer points out (1975, p. 318): "In skill situations, the more one actively 
participates in the event, the more control one has over the outcome. Hence it is predicted that the greater 
one's active involvement in a chance event, the greater the illusion of control." Langer and Roth (1975) also 
found that active involvement in a chance task inflated subjects' sense of control over outcomes. 
By requiring decision makers to enter the desired values of decision variables and assumptions into a 
model, what-if analysis increases the degree of active involvement in the decision task relative to unaided 
decision making. In the studies cited above in which what-if analysis led to inflated performance beliefs, 
subjects did in fact take significantly longer using what-if analysis versus unaided (Kottemann, et al., 1994; 
Davis & Kottemann, 1994), though it is not clear whether the increased confidence was due to additional 
time spent entering scenarios or examining predicted outcomes. The design proposed below attempts to 
clarify this by independently manipulating entry of scenarios and examination of outcomes. 
Imaginability of Outcomes.  
An alternative mechanism by which what-if analysis may lead to inflated decision confidence is by 
increasing the "imaginability of outcomes." By examining the results of many hypothetical scenarios, 
decision makers may find it easier to imagine more successful outcomes than in cases where the number of 
explicit scenarios examined is low (e.g., zero in the case of unaided decision making or one in the case of a 
quantitative decision rule). Much research has shown that judgments of the likelihood of an event are 
influenced by the ease with which the event can be imagined (Anderson, 1983; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In the present context, we suggest that using what-if analysis to 
examine the simulated outcomes associated with a range decision scenarios, some of which represent fairly 
successful outcomes, decision makers would find it easier to imagine a successful outcome than would be 
possible unaided.  
Method  
There are thus two potential theoretical mechanisms, active involvement and imaginability of outcomes, 
either of which could plausibly lead decision makers to have inflated decision confidence using what-if 
analysis.  
The experiment will employ a 2x2 factorial between-subjects design. Subjects will be introduced to a 
decision model calibrated to a base case scenario; the outcome associated with the base scenario will be 
displayed to all subjects. Subjects will be given the decision inputs associated with ten additional decision 
scenarios (counterbalanced in their presentation order). Active involvement will be manipulated by 
controlling whether or not subjects are asked to manually enter into the computer model the inputs 
associated with the scenarios. Imaginability of outcomes will be manipulated by showing or not showing 
subjects the model-predicted results of the scenarios. Thus, group 1 sees but does not enter the inputs, and 
does not see the outcomes. Group 2 sees both the inputs and the outcomes, but does no data entry. Group 3 
manually enters the inputs but does not see the outcomes. Group 4 manually enters the inputs and sees the 
outcomes. All subjects will then be asked to answer questionnaire items regarding their perceived 
decisional confidence, degree of active involvement, and ease of imagining successful outcomes. 
The experiment will be conducted during Summer 1996. Participants will be recruited from among MBA 
and undergraduate business students at large Mid-Atlantic University. A minimum sample size of 60 is 
intended. 
The results obtained from this research effort should serve to inform the efforts to design interventions 
aimed at reducing overconfidence using what-if analysis as well as identify possible sources of biased 
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